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(Anti)Canonizing Courts
Jamal Greene
JAMAL GREENE is Professor of
Law at Columbia Law School. He
has published articles in such jour-
nals as the Columbia Law Review,
the Yale Law Journal, and the Har-
vard Law Review, and has contri -
buted to volumes such as The Health
Care Case: The Supreme Court’s Deci-
sion and Its Implications (ed. Gillian
Metzger, Trevor Morrison, and
Nathaniel Persily, 2013) and Research
Handbook in Comparative Constitu-
tional Law (ed. Rosalind Dixon and
Tom Ginsburg, 2011; with Vicki C.
Jackson).
Cadiz, Ohio isn’t “the proudest small town in
Amer ica” for nothing.1 Cadiz has just 3,500 residents,
but it has produced more than its share of American
heroes. Edwin Stanton, the former U.S. Attorney
Gen eral and Abraham Lincoln’s Secretary of War,
lived and practiced law in Cadiz. The town was a
one-time home to George Custer, who, prior to his
infamy at Little Bighorn, helped secure Robert E.
Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. And Cadiz was the
hometown of John Bingham, the Republican sena-
tor, prosecutor of Lincoln’s assassins, and principal
drafter of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.
If the Civil War and Reconstruction inaugurated
Amer ica’s “second founding,”2 these sons of Cadiz
were among its second founders.
The most popular tourist attraction in Cadiz hon-
ors none of these men: it is, rather, a museum of the
reconstructed birthplace of Clark Gable. Gable is
most famous, of course, for his portrayal of Rhett
Butler, the charming, iconoclastic antihero of the
½lm adaptation of Margaret Mitchell’s novel Gone
with the Wind. It is ironic but not surprising that Cadiz
is known and celebrated less for its famous Civil War
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the roles of culture in creating them and of social movements in overcoming them. This essay argues for
approaching these decisions as ordinary products of political culture rather than extraordinary products
of judicial malfeasance. Doing so honors those who struggled for progress and may invigorate our political
imagination in the present.
and Reconstruction architects than for its
connection to the popular literary master -
piece of the Lost Cause movement.
The hold that Lost Cause ideology re -
tains on America’s Civil War narrative has
been well described by historians like
David Blight and Eric Foner.3 It was not
until the heyday of the civil rights era that
the so-called Dunning School fell out of
favor and was replaced by “revisionists”:
that is, those who refused to defend the Ku
Klux Klan or to represent Reconstruction
as, in Mitchell’s telling, “half a nation at -
tempting, at the point of a bayonet, to force
upon the other half the rule of negroes,
many of them scarcely one generation out
of the African jungle.”4 As Blight writes in
his Race and Reunion, “[t]he memory of sla -
very, emancipation, and the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments never ½t well
into a developing narrative in which the
Old and New South were romanticized
and welcomed back to a new nationalism,
and in which devotion alone made every-
one right, and no one truly wrong, in the
remembered Civil War.”5
Less appreciated is the role that our per -
ception of courts has played and continues
to play in the narrative of benign continu-
ity that Blight so carefully reconstructs.
Courts hold a high place in American life.
The U.S. Supreme Court in particular en -
joys what political scientists call “diffuse
support” from the American people: a de -
gree of reverence that is relatively insen-
sitive to how people feel about speci½c de -
ci sions.6 Thanks to this support, the Court
maintains consistently higher approval
rat ings than Congress and the President,
even in the low days after the Court’s deci -
sion in Bush v. Gore.7 Constitutional schol-
ars in the United States have long wrestled
with what legal scholar Alexander Bickel
termed the “countermajoritarian dif½cul -
ty”: the democratic de½cit created by an
unelected court overturning a legislative
decision. The very notion of a counter-
majoritarian dif½culty, long disputed by 
positive political scientists,8 presupposes
that courts stand courageously (if unac-
countably) apart from society, as a “they”
rather than a “we.”
This tendency to view courts as exter-
nal to society may be succinctly termed
the canonization of courts. There are many
explanations for this phenomenon9–and
they are not mutually exclusive–but one
in particular organizes the remainder of
this essay: aggrandizement of courts, both
for good and for ill, helps to enable a pro -
cess of collective neutralization of historic
injustice, and racial injustice most partic-
ularly. The term neutralization comes from
the criminological literature and refers to
strategies that guilty persons employ to
overcome or ameliorate cognitive incon-
sistency between the norms they believe
in and those their actions support.10 The
rhetorical structure of constitutional argu -
ment in controversial cases is often organ-
ized around what I and others have termed
an “anticanon” of cases that both constitu -
tional lawyers and ordinary citizens un -
derstand to be wrongly decided;11 Dred
Scott v. Sandford (1857), Plessy v. Ferguson
(1896), and Lochner v. New York (1905) are
easily the most prominent examples.12
Our collective insistence that these cases
were wrong the day they were decided im -
plies that ad hoc decision-making by
judges, rather than the culture of which
those judges are part, underlies actions we
now believe to be unethical or immoral.
This rhetorical practice neutralizes the
contribution that culture, and in particular
our hydra-headed culture of white supre -
macy, has made to constitutional law.
With in the universe of constitutional rhet-
oric, the main bene½ciary of this process
is historical argument proceeding from the
authority of the original framers or from
deep American traditions. The persuasive-
ness of this form of argument de pends on
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tional drafters and the present gen er ation,
which–in the absence of a suc ces sful neu-
tralization strategy–cognitive dis sonance
does not permit. Canonization of courts
through anticanonization of cases there-
fore harbors a conservative and juris path ic
bias: one that supports a sin gle and deter -
ministic rather than a dy namic and fluid
understanding of constitutional meaning.
Opening constitutional law to progres-
sive contestation requires, counterintui -
tively, that we destabilize the notion that
Dred Scott, Plessy, and Lochner were wrong
the day they were decided. The possibility
that these decisions were wrong because
successive generations worked hard to
make them wrong renders the judges that
made and unmade these decisions neither
heroes nor antiheroes, but simply judges.
Constitutional law is haunted by the past,
but selectively so. The Dred Scott, Plessy,
and Lochner decisions in particular are as -
sum ed by opinion-writers and legal audi-
ences to be irredeemably wrong and are
cited in mod ern cases precisely for this
reason. Le gal scholarship overwhelming-
ly identi ½es these cases as belonging to a
constitutional law “anticanon”;13 consti-
tutional law case books tend to give these
cases sub stantial treatment even though
they are dis credited and no longer good
law;14 and they continue to appear in mod -
ern opinions even though they do not con -
tain reliable pro po sitions of law.15 Nomi-
nees to federal courts are unusually candid
about their views on these cases, indicat-
ing that their negative status is settled law.
For example, at his con ½rmation hearing
for Chief Justice, then-Judge John Roberts
sta ted categorical ly that he would not
“agree or disagree with particular deci-
sions,” but then went on to testify over the
course of the hearing that he disagreed
with four de cisions: Dred Scott, Plessy, Loch -
ner, and argu ably the other mem ber of the
anticanon, Korematsu v. United States.16 The
typical struc ture of judicial argument from
the anticanon is thus: my opponent is
wrong because the proposition he or she
states is consistent with, as the case may
be, Dred Scott, Plessy, or Lochner.
Each of these decisions was supported
by general propositions of constitutional
law or judicial method, such as textualism,
originalism, or stare decisis, that are per -
sua sive in other contexts. Indeed, it is their
harmony with accepted approaches to
con stitutional law that enables antican on -
 ical cases to be so consistently in voked
against one’s opponents.17 But each deci-
sion is also associated with a concept that
the country has since rejected as un ethical:
chattel slavery (Dred Scott), Jim Crow (Ples -
sy), or la bor exploitation (Lochner). What
it means, then, for these cases to have been
wrong ab initio is that the judges who ren-
dered them were rogue or incompetent,
and that the norms they en forced in our
name were their own corrupt personal
norms, not those of the American people
or the Constitution. Anticanonicity as a
rhetorical ex er cise casts judges as villain-
ous outsiders rather than as products of a
constitutional culture that has since be -
come foreign to us.
Consider, ½rst, Dred Scott. In modern dis -
cussion, the signi½cant errors of Chief Jus-
tice Taney’s opinion for the Court were
two fold. First, its holding that black Amer -
icans could not be citizens of the United
States is said to be both racist and simply
wrong as a matter of original understand-
ing.18 But if the Dred Scott decision is wrong
for these reasons, then the Fourteenth
Amendment–which purported to make
citizens of native-born blacks and to con-
fer substantive rights of citizenship upon
them–merely restored the Constitution’s
original meaning. The notion that Recon -
struction was, in Foner’s terms, a revolution,
rings hollow if its most signi½cant legal
developments did little more than correct
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the case, perhaps the Lost Cause move-
ment is right that black emancipation in
the South was simply a matter of time, that
Southerners would have come to a differ-
ent and better racial reconciliation had
they only been permitted to do so in their
own way.
Chief Justice Taney’s second signi½cant
error is said to be his holding that the Con -
stitution’s Fifth Amendment required slav -
ery to be permitted in federal territories,
which was unnecessary to decide the case
and may have precipitated or accelerated
the march to war. But the notion that Dred
Scott is wrong because it hastened the Civil
War implies that the war was un necessary
or should have been delayed. This is not
the place to defend the necessity of the
Civil War, except to say that its lack of ne -
cessity is hardly obvious–no more obvi-
ous, it seems, than the rightness of Neville
Chamberlain’s actions in Munich. The
view that the war’s onset was lamentable
is consistent with the Lost Cause view that
“everyone was right, and no one truly
wrong” in the conflict. That Dred Scott is
wrong feels self-evident from the perspec-
tive of black freedom, but the more we ar -
gue that Taney made a major legal error in
departing from the Constitution, the more
we diminish the emancipatory achieve-
ments of the Reconstruction generation.
The anticanonicity of Plessy and Lochner
similarly places the American people and
their collective attitudes and norms at the
margins rather than at the center of un eth -
 ical behavior. There is debate as to whether
Plessy v. Ferguson, which upheld the “sepa-
rate but equal” racial segregation of rail
cars in Louisiana, is consistent with the
original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But Plessy is easily accommo-
dated within the settlement over Re con -
struction symbolized by the Compromise
of 1877. Under that agreement, House Dem -
o crats handed the disputed 1876 presiden-
tial election to Republican Rutherford B.
Hayes in exchange for the withdrawal of
the remaining federal troops from south-
ern states and the de facto end to Recon-
struction. After 1877, Southern states were
typically ruled by so-called Redeemer gov -
ernments free from northern oversight or
concern–which eventually instituted Jim
Crow laws, such as the 1890 Separate Car
Act at issue in Plessy. Plessy’s over whelm ing
7–1 margin reflected an emerging consen -
sus among large segments of the white
population that Reconstruction was a mis-
step, or at least should be so regarded under
the terms of reconciliation. “It was quite
common in the ’eighties and ’nine ties,”
his torian C. Vann Woodward reports in The
Strange Case of Jim Crow, “to ½nd in The Na -
tion, Harper’s Weekly, the North Amer ican Re -
view, or the Atlantic Monthly Northern lib -
erals and former abolitionists mount ing
the shibboleths of white su prem acy re -
gard ing the Negro’s innate infe riority, shift -
lessness, and hope less un½t ness for full
par ticipation in the white man’s civiliza-
tion.”19 Woodward writes that these atti-
tudes “doubtless did much to add to the
reconciliation of North and South.”20
View ing Plessy instead as a detour by the
Court in the steady march to racial justice
ab solves the post-Reconstruction genera-
tion of responsibility for its regressive
racial politics. 
The history of Alabama’s anti-miscege -
nation laws is illustrative. Under section
3602 of the Alabama Code of 1867, blacks
and whites were prohibited from inter-
marriage, adultery, or fornication. The pe -
nal code also punished fornication or adul-
tery between people of the same race,21
but it prescribed a lighter punishment. In
Ellis v. State (1868), the Alabama Supreme
Court upheld section 3602 as consistent
with the Civil Rights Act of 1866, a statu-
tory precursor to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, notwithstanding its differential pun -
ishment scheme.22 The author of that
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er, was elected to Alabama’s high court by
a Confederate legislature at the end of the
war and was head of the committee that
drafted the Code of 1867. Reconstruction
produced a new Alabama Constitution in
1868, resulting in a new slate of justices
popularly elected under universal male suf -
frage. Those justices overruled Ellis in an
1872 case called Burns v. State.23 But Ala-
bama Democrats retook the statehouse in
1874 through a combination of old-fash-
ioned political violence against blacks and
scalawags and a state Republican party
splintered by divisions over issues of “so -
cial equality.”24 The 1874 election led to a
new Constitution, a new penal code that
reinstated the law invalidated in Burns, and
three new Democratic justices on the Ala -
bama Supreme Court. Those justices over -
ruled Burns in 1877.25
Six years later, the U.S. Supreme Court
itself upheld the state’s interracial adultery
punishment scheme in Pace v. Alabama,
using the same formalist logic as Plessy: a
law punishing interracial adultery more
harshly did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause so long as it punished whites
and blacks equally. Pace was a unanimous
decision joined even by the sainted John
Marshall Harlan, who dissented so fa mous -
 ly in Plessy. Pace was less the result of rogue
judges than of a rogue nation, unable to
summon the political will necessary to pre -
serve the gains of Reconstruction in the
Deep South. So, too, Plessy, which would
have been a far more remarkable decision
at the time had it come out the other way.
Tellingly, the headline in the New Orleans
Daily Picayune on May 19, 1896, the day after
the Plessy decision, read: “Equality, but not
Socialism.”
Which brings us to Lochner. The Lochner
decision overturned a New York law pass ed
unanimously in both chambers of the legis -
lature that regulated the hours of bakery
work ers. It did so on the grounds that the
state had not suf½ciently demonstrated that
bakers’ work was so unhealthy or that bak-
ers were so in need of legislative protection
as to reasonably justify state intervention
into the labor market. Lochner be speaks the
startling speed with which the Fourteenth
Amendment was transformed from a pro -
vision primarily protective of freed slaves
to one primarily protective of corporations
seeking to avoid state regulation. The
Slaughter-House Cases, decided in 1873 (½ve
years after the Fourteenth Amendment was
rati½ed), rejected a claim that the Amend -
ment prevented the state from regulating
the market for butchers, and in so doing
stated the indispensable purpose of the Re -
construction Amendments to be “the free-
dom of the slave race . . . and the protection
of the newly made freeman and citizen
from the oppressions of those who had
for merly exercised un limited dominion
over him.”26 Plessy sym bolized a collective
abandonment of that lofty goal, and Loch -
ner represented a com mitment to a new
one entirely.
Judges and lawyers overuse Lochner, how -
ever, and in the process obscure the fact
that the case represents the triumph of a
distinctive political ideology but only a
pedestrian judicial one. The main criticism
from the right is that Lochner wrongly pro -
tected unenumerated constitutional rights;
that it specially protected the right to con -
tract is incidental to its broader mis step.
The main criticism from the left is that
Loch ner protected the wrong unenumer-
ated constitutional rights: the right to con -
 tract rather than, say, the rights to priva-
cy, family autonomy, or sexual freedom.
This set of criticisms leaves the irreduc ible
sin of Loch ner, the error that under writes
its anti can onicity, as its recognition of the
right to con tract. The New Deal Settlement
that aban doned Lochner places this right
under the banner of “social and economic”
rights, to be judicially recognized only if
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This is a deeply conservative outcome.
The failure of American courts, particularly
at the federal level, to entertain the justi-
ciability of social and economic rights
leaves core questions of economic justice
entirely to political processes ill-suited to
protect the interests of the poor. Rights to
education, health, welfare, and housing
that are recognized with various degrees of
vigor in other Western democracies are
typ ically relegated to the margins, or worse,
of U.S. constitutional protection.
Anticanonicity is path-dependent, and
Lochner’s particular path to infamy shapes
its rhetorical meaning. As legal scholar
David Bernstein has shown, Lochner did
not speak for its era until the 1960s and
1970s, when conservatives used the case to
attack Griswold v. Connecticut and its proge-
ny.28 Liberals distinguished Lochner as pro -
tecting economic rights because at that his -
torical moment, the rights they sought to
defend concerned private decision-making
and were decidedly non-economic. The
dis tinction, for example, between use and
sale of contraceptives, later abandoned as
constitutionally irrelevant, was vitally im -
portant to the rhetorical mission of the
right-to-privacy cases: they were precisely
not about those arm’s-length transactions
that are the bread and butter of govern-
ment social policy.29
Other strategies were available, if less
ob vious. Rather than viewing Lochner as a
case about the perils of judicial protection
for economic rights, one might instead
view it as a case about a judicial preference
for the economic rights of the strong over
those of the weak. Recall that both sides in
Lochner sought to protect economic rights.
The bakeries wished to protect their rights
to enter into coercive labor contracts, and
the government wished to protect the
rights of bakers to reasonable living stan-
dards. Likewise, minimum wage laws
(such as those invalidated in Lochner-era
decisions, including Adkins v. Children’s Hos-
pital [1923] and Moorehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo [1936]) are directed at the econom-
ic rights of workers to fair pay. Cases like
Coppage v. Kansas (1915) and Adair v. United
States (1908), which protected the right of
employers to enter into yellow-dog con-
tracts with workers, overturned govern-
ment policies that sought to protect col -
lective bargaining rights.30 From a pro-
gressive perspective, the problem with the
Lochner opinion is not that it protected the
wrong liberty rights–liberty of contract
rather than privacy–but that it protected
the wrong economic rights. 
The alternate universe in which Lochn-
er’s social meaning is fully consistent with
the justiciability of economic rights is one
in which judges may address claims of
health or housing or education rights on
their merits rather than reject them at the
threshold. In Dandridge v. Williams (1970),
for example, in which the Court rejected a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
Mary land’s cap on welfare bene½ts, Justice
Stewart wrote for the Court: “In the area of
economics and social welfare, a State does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classi½cations made
by its laws are imperfect.”31 Astute observ -
ers will recognize in this formulation the
continuing in terrorem effect of Lochner and
the generation of cases it represents. But if
we view Lochner as wrong but not anti-
canonical, our rejection of Lochner may be
consistent with our dissent from Dan dridge.
The New York bakers’ law sought to realize
a protestant conception of economic rights
as proceeding from popular and legislative
as well as judicial understandings. Lochner
is not, in this view, a case about arrogant
judges ½nding rights where none exist; it is
rather a case about politically attuned jud -
ges using the courts to enforce the rights of
some against the rights of others. 
The outcome of that contest in Lochner
reflected the might of a laissez-faire politi-
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tory for our having renounced it. And view -
ing the renunciation of Lochner in West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937) and subsequent
cases not as the inevitable regression of law
to its proper, sublimated place but rath er as
the triumph of a particular political project,
contingent on the efforts of social move-
ments to capture political and legal elites,
respects rather than ignores the role of pop-
ular agency in constructing legal meaning.
The modern view of Dred Scott, Plessy, and
Lochner as both wrong the day they were
de cided and uniquely instructive for con-
stitutional judges abides a process of
neutral ization that is far bigger than the
Court and its docket. The concept of neu-
tralization ½nds its roots in social psycho -
logist Leon Festinger’s work on cognitive
dissonance.32 Festinger’s two-pronged hy -
pothesis, which we now take to be nearly
axiomatic, was as follows. First, inconsis-
tency within a person’s normative uni-
verse or between his views and his actions
is “psychologically uncomfortable” and
“mo tivate[s] the person to try to reduce the
dissonance and achieve conso nance.”33
Second, individuals do not merely reduce
dissonance but also “actively avoid situa-
tions and information which would likely
increase the dissonance.”34 Strategies for
reducing dissonance in clude, for exam-
ple, changing one of the dissonant beliefs
by seek ing out others who can af½rm one’s
disagreement with it, soliciting additional
information that reduces the dissonance,
and avoiding in formation that enlarges it.35
Writing contemporaneously with Fes-
tinger, criminologists Gresham Sykes and
David Matza studied the ways in which ju -
venile delinquents deflect or overcome in -
ter nal and social disapproval. Sykes and
Mat za outlined ½ve “techniques of neu -
tral ization,” but we need only concern our -
selves here with their ½rst: “denial of re -
spon sibility.” As Sykes and Matza des crib -
ed: “In effect, the delinquent ap proaches
a ‘billiard ball’ conception of himself in
which he sees himself as helplessly pro-
pelled into new situations.” The deviant,
they argued, “learn[s] to view him self as
more acted upon than acting.”36 Viewing
the protection and abetting of slavery, Jim
Crow, and labor exploitation as the work
of rogue or countermajoritarian courts ½ts
a similar pattern of collective self-aliena -
tion. As legal scholar Jack Balkin has writ-
ten, “We say that a case like Plessy was
wrong the day it was decided in order to
avoid concluding that we are the type of
people whose Constitution would say such
a thing. The case does not reflect our nature
or who we are.”37
I do not mean to ascribe delinquency or
social deviance to those who deploy the
rhetoric of anticanonicity. Indeed, it is the
opposite. My suggestion is that the incon -
sistency between modern legal and ethical
assumptions and past collective behavior
creates a collective sense of dissonance that
is normal rather than exceptional. Based
on study of young, liberal Germans in the
1990s coping with the Holocaust, crimi-
nologist Moshe Hazani concluded that
techniques of neutralization, including
denial of responsibility, are not just the
tools of delinquents but “universal modes
of resolving cognitive inconsistency.”38
This kind of group neutralization is not the
same as revisionism; it need not involve a
conscious, reflective reevaluation of the
past. The idea, rather, is that the subcon-
scious need to reduce cognitive dissonance
–reflected in Blight’s work on the Civil
War’s aftermath–precedes and moti vates
elements of legal culture, including the
social meaning of anticanonical cases. We
enlarge the role of courts in part to deny
our collective moral responsibility.
Other distinctive features of American
constitutional law could not exist in their
current form without the neutralization of
past injustice that court canonization helps
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ical approaches to constitutional ar gument
is one such feature. An ethical-historical
constitutional argument is one that ad -
vances a proposition of constitutional sig -
ni½cance by reference to historical ½gures
or traditions that “vouch” for the proposi-
tion. (“Ethical” is thus used here in the
clas sical sense of an appeal to the charac-
ter of the speaker, a de½nition consistent
with scholar Philip Bobbitt’s work on con -
stitutional argument.39) The argument, for
example, that the Establishment Clause
was originally understood to forbid gov-
ernment funding of religion be cause Mad -
ison’s “Memorial and Re mon strance” was
directed at this practice is a form of ethical-
historical argument.40 It recruits a promi-
nent Framer in order to defend and legiti-
mate a proposition re gard ing the history
of the First Amendment.
Ethical-historical argument overlaps,
but is not coextensive with, the family of
interpretive theories known to constitu-
tional scholars as originalism. Originalism
is the view that a constitutional provision
has what its drafters or rati½ers took to be
its meaning or scope at the time of enact-
ment. Originalism is a theory of interpre-
tation, whereas ethical-historical argu-
ment is a rhetoric of justi½cation. Except
to the degree of its overlap with ethical-
historical argument, originalism does not
signi½cantly drive the work of U.S. federal
courts. (Anyone with any doubt on this
score might note that in the blockbuster
2012 term of the Supreme Court, a faithful
originalist would likely have upheld both
section four of the Voting Rights Act and
section three of the Defense of Marriage
Act, an outcome not favored by a single Jus -
tice.) By contrast, ethical-historical argu-
ment has substantial purchase both within
and outside of judicial practice. Arguments
that use the Framers or their traditions to
grant authority to modern practices and
lim itations hold a central place within the
constitutional culture of the United States.
This is a contingent phenomenon. Con -
sider the case of South Africa. One of the
most recognized influences on the govern-
ment of apartheid-era South Africa is the
work of the British theorist A. V. Dicey.
Dicey is famous for his aggressive defense
of parliamentary sovereignty, a concept
invested with white-supremacist charac-
ter in an apartheid state in which only
whites may vote. In particular, as the post-
 apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Com -
mission Report found, South African law -
yers and judges relied on Diceyan princi-
ples to defend practices of legislative def-
erence during the apartheid era.41 In the
South African constitutional law and cul-
ture of today, citing Dicey to defend ac qui -
escence to parliamentary authority would
be viewed with considerable suspicion,
even as Dicey’s skill as a theoretician re -
mains unquestioned.42
We do we not regard Jefferson, Madison,
and Washington in this way. All were Vir -
gin ian slaveholders instrumental in creat-
ing a brutal slavocracy and yet all are re -
cruit ed to speak for constitutional pro po -
sitions far more readily than Bingham,
Charles Sumner, Jacob Howard, or other
heroes of the second founding. South Afri -
cans view their renunciation of apart heid
as a genuine rupture. The preamble to the
Interim Constitution refers directly to “a
need to create a new order,” and no one be -
lieves that the terms of reconciliation per -
mit the suggestion that the pre-1994 order
was anything other than indefensibly ille -
gitimate. This fact, more than any other,
pre cludes a strong role for ethical- his tor -
ical argument in the constitutional law
and culture of South Africa. Multiple, inter -
related, and largely successful strategies of
neutralization help to preserve a role for
such arguments in the United States.
Ethical-historical argument, although it
is partly external to constitutional law, is
nonetheless potent enough to impose a
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As legal scholar Robert Post has de tailed at
some length, constitutional law proceeds
in continuous dialogue with the values and
beliefs of non-judicial actors.43 Constitu-
tional law both regulates constitutional
culture,44 as when judges and law yers help
to determine the social meaning of Dred
Scott, Plessy, and Lochner; and is bound by
that culture, as when interpreters under-
stand certain social and eco nomic rights as
matters of political discretion. It is dif½ -
cult not to notice that social and economic
rights receive explicit judicial protection in
South Africa.45
Would a constitutional culture that un -
der stands Reconstruction in revolutionary
terms permit the Supreme Court to inval-
idate a federal voting rights law on account
of its extraordinary success in en fran chis -
ing black Americans? Would a constitu-
tional culture that has internalized the costs
of our departure from Jim Crow produce
a Court that challenges the University of
Texas–the defendant in Sweatt v. Painter46
–for discriminating against white appli-
cants? Would a constitutional culture that
regards Lochner’s repudiation as a triumph
for economic rights be consonant with a
Court that scolds Congress for seeking to
guarantee health insurance to every Amer -
ican? These questions nearly answer them -
selves. Deflecting responsibility for Dred
Scott, Plessy, and Lochner onto the Courts
that decided those cases is integral to a legal
narrative that helps con struct a very dif-
ferent constitutional culture than the one
described above.
It has become a favorite criticism of Su -
preme Court–centered scholarship to note
that the nine Justices are a they rath er than
an it. The numerous inconsistencies in the
Court’s jurisprudence, so easily identi½ed
as to be uninteresting, are often attributa-
ble to a single swing Justice, or else to an
eclectic coalition whose incomplete over-
lap of views constitute a “holding” that
none agreed to individually. More should
be made of the fact that the Supreme Court,
and judges more generally, are a “we”
rather than a “they.” Judges may not be like
us, but they are of us. They live–in a thick
sense–in the world they help to gov ern,
their views about that world evolve and
regress as all of ours do, and they adopt ide-
ologies and accept social meanings that
they do not themselves generate. As legal
scholar Robert Cover reminded us, judges
can be powerful instruments of so cial con -
trol, but they do not create law: we do.47
We have good, if not noble, reasons to
forget that. If we the people are a coherent
(though pluralistic) constitutional subject
–a view we might reject but rarely do–
then we are authors of great injustices tol -
er ated and facilitated by law. Dred Scott,
Plessy, and Lochner are said to be antica -
nonical in part so that we do not forget
what we once were, but the way they oper -
ate within the constitutional culture ac -
complishes quite the opposite. Professional
discourse identi½es their unforgivable
errors as obvious legal mistakes, the result
of judges reading their own immor al pol-
itics into the law. In this conception the
Court sits at the center of great wrongs,
awaiting a bold overruling that will place
the law back on its proper course.
Claiming ownership over our history re -
quires deconstruction all the way down.
We must accept Dred Scott and Plessy and
Lochner as we accept a chromosomal con-
dition. Seeing these cases as part of who
we are is psychologically dif½cult, but it
enables us to recognize our agency in over -
coming the limitations they place on our
normative priors. We owe it to Mr. Bing-
ham, and to ourselves, to internalize the
real lesson of anticanonical cases, which,
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